UIC Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 3

Article 4

2022

Johnson v. City of Ferguson: Unreasonable Seizures of
Bystanders of Police Brutality, 55 UIC L. Rev. 587 (2022)
Cashmere Cozart

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections
Commons

Recommended Citation
Cashmere Cozart, Johnson v. City of Ferguson: Unreasonable Seizures of Bystanders of Police Brutality,
55 UIC L. Rev. 587 (2022)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol55/iss3/4
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

JOHNSON V. CITY OF FERGUSON:
UNREASONABLE SEIZURES OF
BYSTANDERS OF POLICE BRUTALITY
CASHMERE COZART*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 587
BACKGROUND ................................................................... 588
A. The Altercation that Led to Michael Brown’s Murder
................................................................................... 589
B. The Indictment ......................................................... 590
C. The Department of Justice Findings on Policing in
Ferguson ................................................................... 591
D. Procedural History of Dorian Wilson’s Suit ........... 594
E. The Eighth Circuit Affirmed the District Court .... 596
III. COURT’S ANALYSIS ........................................................... 599
A. The En Banc Panel Held that Johnson was not Seized
and Vacates the Lower Court Decision .................. 599
B. The Dissent Would Affirm the Lower Court .......... 601
C. Effects on the Parties............................................... 604
D. Effect on the Community......................................... 605
E. Legal Effects ............................................................. 606
IV. PERSONAL ANALYSIS ....................................................... 608
A. Fourth Amendment Issue........................................ 608
B. Circuit Split on move on orders .............................. 609
C. Issues with SCOTUS and Qualified Immunity ..... 609
D. Congress Needs to Act ............................................. 611
E. Inconsistency Issue .................................................. 611
F. Comparison to Voting Rights Act ........................... 612
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................... 613

I.

INTRODUCTION

Technology has allowed African Americans to document and
instantly spread awareness of the violence that African American
citizens face at the hands of police. It is difficult to deny the violence
that police enact on African Americans when watching a video of an
officer tasing someone while they are in a car with their children or
kneeling on their neck until they die. One of the issues in the larger
discussion of police brutality are the cases that arise from these acts
of violence. Often people see videos of the violence, and the only
other highly publicized information is whether the officer gets
indicted. Rarely are the suits from bystanders and companions
heavily publicized even though they can pose unique constitutional
issues as well.
This Case Note will analyze Johnson v. City of Ferguson,
Missouri, a case where the plaintiff, Dorian Johnson, was with
Michael Brown when Brown was murdered by police officer Darren
Wilson.1 Part II of this Case Note will go over the background of this
case and its relevance to the larger issue of police brutality and
* Cashmere Cozart, Juris Doctor Candidate 2022, UIC School of Law.
1. Johnson v. City of Ferguson, Missouri, 926 F.3d 504, 505-07 (8th Cir.
2019) reh’g en banc, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 553 (2019).
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unreasonable seizures. Then, Part III will detail the Eighth
Circuit’s holding which concluded that there was no Fourth
Amendment seizure and granted qualified immunity to Wilson and
the police chief. Finally, Part IV will offer an in-depth analysis of
the court’s holding, focusing on the lack of consistency in Fourth
Amendment unreasonable seizures jurisprudence and how it can be
remedied. This lack of consistency plays a large role in the
uncontrollable police brutality that American citizens face,
especially African American citizens, every day. If the police feel
they are above the law, especially when it pertains to the murders
of unarmed African Americans, they will continue to commit these
murders on tape for the world to see because they know they will
not be held accountable.

II. BACKGROUND
The summer of 2020 was full of social unrest in response to
the murders of Breonna Taylor, George Floyd, and Ahmaud Arbery
by police officers with people proclaiming Black Lives Matter.2
“#BlackLivesMatter [the organization] was founded in 2013 in
response to the acquittal of Trayvon Martin’s murderer.”3 The
hashtag became a unifying slogan in response to police violence
against Black people, especially after the murder of Michael Brown
in Ferguson, Missouri.4 The protests drew an aggressive response
from law enforcement, which stunned and radicalized a generation
of activists.5 This section will go over the altercation that led to
Darren Wilson killing Michael Brown and the protests that ensued.
Then this section will turn to the Department of Justice’s report on
policing in Ferguson. Finally, it will cover the holdings of Dorian
Johnson’s case in the district court and Eighth Circuit.

2. Black Lives Taken: George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery:
What’s happening and what you can do., DOSOMETHING.ORG,
www.dosomething.org/us/articles/black-lives-taken
[perma.cc/DR3P-MPNA]
(last visited Apr. 9, 2022) (covering the killings of three African Americans
whose deaths became the catalyst for protests in summer 2020 and what actions
people are taking).
3. About, BLACK LIVES MATTER NETWORK, www.blacklivesmatter.com/
about/ [perma.cc/6EJQ-M42B] (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
4. See Jose A. Del Real et al., How the Black Lives Matter Movement Went
Mainstream. WASH. POST. (June 9, 2020), www.washingtonpost.com/
national/how-the-black-lives-matter-movement-wentmainstream/2020/06/09/201bd6e6-a9c6-11ea-9063e69bd6520940_story.html [perms.cc/33J7-VGSG] (discussing how Black Lives
Matter as an ideology has evolved into something that is now a part of the
everyday discourse). When it first became popular seven years ago, it was
considered a radical idea, but now it has gained support from celebrities and
politicians. Id.
5. Id.

2022]

Johnson v. City of Ferguson

589

A. The Altercation that Led to Michael Brown’s Murder
On August 9, 2014, Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael
Brown.6 Brown’s body was left out in the August sun for four hours
on the very street where Wilson killed him.7 “Neighbors were
horrified by the gruesome scene: Mr. Brown, [eighteen years old],
face down in the middle of the street, blood streaming from his
head.”8 Local residents posted pictures of the scene on social media
to express their outrage at a teen being killed and left out on the
street.9 Social media played a pivotal role in the unfolding of this
case because the attention was quickly fixed on Ferguson as many
average people traveled to Ferguson to protest and tweet live
updates about what was happening.10 The facts, as alleged in the
complaint, are as follows:
On August 9, 2014, at approximately 12:00 noon, Plaintiff and
Michael Brown, Jr., both African American males, were ‘peacefully
and lawfully walking down Canfield Drive in Ferguson, Missouri.’ A
marked police vehicle driven by Wilson stopped next to Plaintiff and
Brown, and Wilson ordered the pair to ‘Get the f*ck on the sidewalk.’
Wilson continued to drive his vehicle several yards, put it into
reverse, and parked it at an angle to block the path of Plaintiff and
Brown, stopping the vehicle within inches of Brown. The complaint
alleges that Wilson forcefully opened his door which struck Brown,
and then reached through his open window and grabbed Brown who
was closer to Wilson than was Plaintiff. Wilson threatened to shoot
his weapon. As Brown struggled to break free, Wilson discharged his
weapon twice, striking Brown in the arm. Fearing for his life, Plaintiff
ran away from Wilson ‘simultaneously with Brown.’ Wilson did not
order Plaintiff or Brown to stop or freeze but withdrew his weapon
and fired ‘at Plaintiff [and Brown]’ as they fled, striking Brown
several more times (and killing him). 11
6. See Julie Bosman & Joseph Goldstein, Timeline for a Body: 4 Hours in the
Middle of a Ferguson Street, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/us/michael-brown-a-bodys-timeline-4-hours-ona-ferguson-street.html [perma.cc/DSQ7-9NHW] (reporting on the lapse in time
of why it took so long to remove Michael Brown’s body). This article covered the
standard time and how this lapse contributed to the unrest. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See They Helped Make Twitter Matter in Ferguson Protests, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 10, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/us/twitter-black-lives-matterferguson-protests.html [perma.cc/9B7Y-CA5E] (focusing on how three average
citizens became known as prominent activists when they traveled to Ferguson
after Michael Brown’s death, and how they live tweeted the protests and helped
keep the rest of the country informed about what was happening on the ground
in Ferguson).
11. Johnson v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15CV00832 AGF, 2016 WL 1023028,
at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 15, 2016), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom.
Johnson v. City of Ferguson, Missouri, 864 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2017), as corrected
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The protests that ensued in Ferguson lasted for weeks.12 The
police actions toward the protestors became increasingly violent.13
Local residents captured images of police using pepper spray, tear
gas, and batons on protesters.14 “Snipers trained their rifles on
protesters.”15 “Officers patrolled city streets in an armored truck
that was built with combat in mind.”16 The police’s militant
response to citizens protesting Michael Brown’s murder is
indicative of the issues created by police brutality.

B. The Indictment
In 2014, a grand jury decided not to indict Darren Wilson for
Michael Brown’s murder.17 The evidence included conflicting
statements about everything ranging from the eyewitness
statements to Brown’s autopsies to the injuries Wilson had the day
of the murder.18 Wilson claimed that Brown hit him in the face
multiple times while he was sitting in the car and began waving his
gun since he did not have his taser on him and felt he was not able
to use mace.19 According to Wilson, he began shooting because he

(July 31, 2017), reh’g en banc granted, vacated (Sept. 12, 2017), on reh’g en banc,
926 F.3d 504 (8th Cir. 2019), and rev’d and remanded sub nom. Johnson v. City
of Ferguson, Missouri, 926 F.3d 504 (8th Cir. 2019).
12. See It’s Been 5 Years Since Ferguson. Are Racial Tensions Even Worse
Now? USA TODAY (last updated Aug. 8, 2019), www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2019/08/08/ferguson-missouri-riots-5-years-since-shooting-racetensions-worse/1952853001/ [perma.cc/VTK3-B9XA] (covering the mass
protests in Ferguson and their lasting influence on the town in 2019, five years
later).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Matt Apuzzo, Justice Dept. Report Says Police Escalated Tensions in
Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/draftjustice-dept-report-says-police-escalated-tensions-in-ferguson.html
[perma.cc/XYF7-WW99] (covering the investigation of the Ferguson Police
Department’s activity during the protests following Michael Brown’s death. The
Department of Justice concluded that the Ferguson Police Department
escalated the situation with their use of military tactics).
16. Id.
17. Darren Wilson not indicted: read the full grand jury report, GUARDIAN
(Nov.
25,
2014),
www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/
2014/nov/25/darren-wilson-not-indicted-ferguson
[perma.cc/LN2W-TQXX]
(releasing the full grand jury report after the jury’s decision to not indict Darren
Wilson for shooting Michael Brown).
18. Id.; U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Regarding the Criminal
Investigation Into The Shooting of Michael Brown by Ferguson Police Officer,
Darren Wilson, at 17 (2015) (explaining all three autopsies conducted on
Michael Brown’s body and the differing opinions of the examiners. The first
autopsy was conducted by St. Louis County Medical Examiner, the second by a
private forensic pathologist at the request of the Brown family, and the third
was conducted by the Armed Forced Medical Examiner for the DOJ’s
investigation).
19. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Regarding the Criminal
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felt Brown had reached for a gun and intended to behave
aggressively.20 Most eyewitnesses said Brown had his hands up
when Wilson fatally shot him, while only one witness said Brown
charged at Wilson.21

C. The Department of Justice Findings on Policing in
Ferguson
In 2015, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) published its
report on the state of policing in Ferguson.22 To summarize, the DOJ
found that the “unlawful and harmful practices in policing and in
the municipal court system erode police legitimacy and community
trust, making policing in Ferguson less fair, less effective at
promoting public safety, and less safe.” 23 It found that while the
level of crime in the city stayed consistent, the level of ticketing in
the city under the municipal code increased.24 It was common
practice for officers to issue as many as fourteen tickets in a single
encounter.25 The most serious ticketed offenses, such as driving
under the influence and assault, did not increase.26 The police would
issue tickets under the city municipal code even when there was an
applicable state code so that the city would get revenue from the
ticketing.27
This focus on revenue for the city resulted in consistent
constitutional violations.”28 Police had a pattern of conducting stops
without reasonable suspicion and making arrests without probable
cause, violating the Fourth Amendment.29 This behavior included
Investigation Into The Shooting of Michael Brown by Ferguson Police Officer,
Darren Wilson, at 17 (2015).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson
Police Department, at 28 (2015) [hereinafter DOJ Report].
23. Justice Department Finds a Pattern of Civil Rights Violations by the
Ferguson Police Department, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 4, 2015),
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-findings-two-civilrights-investigations-ferguson-missouri [perma.cc/M9PE-3HUN].
24. DOJ Report, supra note 22, at 28.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 15; Ezekiel Edwards, The DOJ Ferguson Report Isn’t Just an
Indictment of Ferguson Police, but of American Policing Writ Large, ACLU
BLOG (Mar. 6,2015), www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/doj-ferguson-report-isntjust-indictment-ferguson-police-american-policing-writ-large [perma.cc/Q9C93KMH] (discussing how the focus on revenue in Ferguson was not unique, and
links their report on debtors prisons nationwide.).
29. DOJ Report at 17 (detailing an incident where the Ferguson Police
handcuffed an African American man in the parking lot of the apartment
building while on their way to arrest someone in the building). They were aware
the man they handcuffed was not the person they were looking for, but they
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pedestrian stops where officers engaged in “legally unsupportable
stops.”30 The Ferguson Police Department (“FPD”) also did not track
or analyze these pedestrian stops which left the stops open to being
used for discriminatory purposes.31 These stops were made more
harmful because the officers used excessive force while carrying out
the unlawful stops.32 This included the use of canines and tasers
specifically to retaliate against people for not listening to police
instructions.33 The DOJ reviewed many incidents where physical
force was used to inflict punishment and not to neutralize a physical
threat to the officers.34
There was a practice of little to no oversight of the use of force
against citizens.35 The report found that officers rarely reported
uses of force.36 This was reflected in the department’s use of force
reporting, which had stretches of two to four months where no use
of force was reported at all.37 When there were reviews of an officer’s
use of force, the officer’s account of the incident was taken as true
and usually resulted in no consequences for the officer. 38 The
reviews were even more relaxed when the involved officer was at
the sergeant level or above because those officers could review the
use of force incidents they were involved in leaving them
accountable to no one.39 The FPD did not use these incomplete
records to compile reports to detect patterns of officer misconduct,
or excessive force continually being used by the same officers.40 This
prevented the department from doing early intervention to stop
officers from engaging in constitutional violations.41

handcuffed him, put him in the patrol car, and ran his record anyway. Id. He
was the landlord of the building and was willing to help. Id.
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 34 (detailing an incident about Ferguson Police escalating an
unsupported stop. The officers attempted to arrest an African American man
for trespassing even though the man had been invited into the home. Seven
officers subdued the man and used tasers on him after tackling the man who is
5’8 and 170 pounds).
33. See id. at 33 (detailing an incident about retaliatory force they faced from
Ferguson Police.). One man was tased in the back by an officer while peeing on
the floor in the jail. Id. Some of it got on the officer’s pant leg and the only
explanation the officer offered for his behavior was that he tased the man to
stop the ongoing threat of urine. Id.
34. Id. at 33.
35. Id. at 38.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 39.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 40.
40. Id. at 41. Richard Rosenfeld, Ferguson and Police Use of Deadly Force,
80 MO. L. REV. 1076, 1092 (2015) (discussing how the lack of a comprehensive
data on police’s use of deadly force contributes to lack of policy changes on the
local level like Ferguson.). The article also discusses what a national database
of police use of deadly force should include. Id.
41. DOJ Report at 41.
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The report also showed that the FPD used their force almost
exclusively against Black people.42 While only making up sixtyseven percent of the population of Ferguson, Black people made up
ninety-three percent of all arrests, ninety percent of citations, and
eighty-five percent of traffic stops.43 Black people were more likely
to receive multiple citations during each traffic stop.44 The report
found that the racially disparate impact followed African American
people in every stage of law enforcement from traffic stops to the
courts.45 The report concluded that the disparate impact of law
enforcement on African American people violated the “Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection clause which prohibits
discriminatory policing on the basis of race.”46
The DOJ also found direct evidence of racial bias in the work
emails of the town’s officials.47 This included racist statements that
were made about an African American woman who terminated her
pregnancy was rewarded by Crimestoppers, depictions of President
Barack Obama as a chimpanzee, and claims that he would not last
all four years in office because “what Black man holds a steady job
for four years.”48
This report was the basis of the consent decree between
Ferguson and the Department of Justice.49 The consent decree
requires the city to make a multitude of institutional changes to
42. Id. at 62.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 63.
46. Id. at 70.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1976) (holding that the refusal to rezone an area
in a suburb because the new building would be required to be racially integrated
was not unconstitutional because the zoning laws did not have a discriminatory
intent and were facially neutral.) This holding solidifies that laws that have
racially disparate outcomes do not automatically make a law unconstitutional
because of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights Id.; Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (holding that when
there is a pattern or practice of discrimination alleged long evidence of
statistical disparity is significant.) “Where gross statistical disparities can be
shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern
or practice of discrimination.” Id; see also DOJ Report, supra note 22, at 62
(detailing more disproportionate treatment of African Americans by Ferguson
Police Department.). African Americans were sixty-eight percent less likely to
have their case dismissed and in 2013 they accounted for ninety-two percent of
all cases where an arrest warrant was issued. Id.
48. DOJ Report, supra note 22, at 72 (detailing other derogatory emails such
as describing a photograph of topless dancing women in Africa as “Michelle
Obama’s high school reunion”; an email describing a man seeking welfare for
his dogs because they are “mixed in color, unemployed, lazy, can’t speak
English, and have no frigging clue who their Daddies are”; and emails with
offensive stereotypes about Muslims).
49. Consent Decree, United States v. City or Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-000180CDP (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016).
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ensure compliance with the Constitution.50 If the department does
not comply with the consent decree, then the DOJ can enforce the
decree in court.51 This report became important in Dorian Johnson’s
suit against the City of Ferguson because of his supervisory and
municipal liability claims.52

D. Procedural History of Dorian Wilson’s Suit
Dorian Johnson filed suit against Wilson and the former FPD
chief of police in state court.53 Wilson and the chief of police removed
the case to the Eastern District of Missouri.54 The complaint alleged
a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure, excessive force, and
supervisory liability against the former chief.55 Wilson and the chief
of police filed a motion to dismiss, raising a qualified immunity
defense.56
The Fourth Amendment is aimed to protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures.57 When a police officer “accosts
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
‘seized’ that person.”58 Terry v. Ohio authorizes police to conduct
brief investigatory stops of citizens when they have “a reasonable
and articulatable suspicion that crime is underfoot.”59 In the instant
case, Johnson claimed he was seized by Wilson when Wilson created
a roadblock stopping him and Brown from walking in the direction
they were going.60 He claimed this was a Fourth Amendment
violation since this was not a legally justifiable stop. 61 The basis for
the excessive force claim was that Wilson began shooting at him and
Brown during the unlawful stop.62
Johnson’s supervisory liability claim was based largely on
the DOJ report, which concluded that the FPD had a pattern of

50. Id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) (making it unlawful for a law enforcement
officers to engage in a pattern or practice of depriving citizens of their
constitutional rights, it also authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil
actions against government entities they believe are in violation of this statute
to obtain equitable and declaratory relief).
52. Johnson, 2016 WL 1023028, at *7-8.
53. Id. at *1.
54. Id. at *2.
55. Id. at *1.
56. Id. at *5.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
58. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that police officers are
allowed to stop citizens for brief investigatory stops when they suspect that
crime is under way without being found to have seized someone within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
59. Id. at 30.
60. Johnson, 2016 WL 1023028, at *3.
61. Id. at *8.
62. Id.
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constitutional violations.63 He claimed that the lack of proper police
protocol was the reason that Wilson seized him and used excessive
force.64 He also claimed that the police chief’s failure to implement
a system that tracked constitutional violations and officer
misconduct contributed to the force used by Wilson against him.65
Wilson asserted a qualified immunity defense.66 Qualified
immunity is immunity from suit for government officials when they
are acting in the scope of their job.67 It is not meant to protect the
incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law.68 This is an
objective inquiry rather than a subjective one.69 One prong of the
qualified immunity test is: “Taken in the light most favorable to the
party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right?”70 If there is no
constitutional right, then the inquiry ends. 71 The other prong is
“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”72 Wilson claimed that
there was no seizure and, even if there was a seizure, it was not
clearly established that his actions were unlawful. 73 He claimed
that there was no seizure since the roadblock was not a barrier and
Johnson did not submit but chose to flee.74 Johnson claimed that
Wilson knew that creating a roadblock and shooting at him and
Brown was criminal behavior.75
The district court denied Wilson’s motion to dismiss.76 The
district court found that Johnson alleged sufficient facts that there
was a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure to survive a motion
to dismiss.77 This analysis largely depended on the timeframe that
the events took place in considering that Johnson did eventually

63. Id.
64. Id. at *9.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (establishing that excessive
force and qualified immunity are two distinct analyses.). This established
qualified immunity as a two-prong test first there should be an analysis of
whether the officer’s conduct violated a clearly established right, then whether
the right was clearly established. Id.
68. Id. at 202.
69. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (establishing the qualified
immunity standard that government officials are generally shielded from
liability in discretionary functions unless they are violating clearly established
law or rights which a reasonable person would have known).
70. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 202.
73. Johnson, 2016 WL 1023028, at *9.
74. Id. at *6.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *8.
77. Id.

596

UIC Law Review

[55:587

flee the scene.78 The district court also denied the motion to dismiss
the excessive force claims because in viewing the facts most
favorably to Johnson, Wilson shot at Johnson during a Fourth
Amendment unreasonable seizure.79 The qualified immunity
defense was also rejected because the facts alleged that a reasonable
officer in that scenario would have known they were “violat[ing]
clearly established federal law.”80
The district court denied the motion to dismiss the
supervisory liability claims and the municipality liability claims. 81
The district court concluded that Johnson pled sufficient facts to
show that there was liability in not only the police chief, but the city
government, as well.82 These claims both stemmed from the culture
of law enforcement analyzed by the DOJ in Ferguson which led to a
long history of constitutional violations against its African
American residents.83

E. The Eighth Circuit Affirmed the District Court
In the Eighth Circuit’s original opinion, it affirmed the
district court’s finding that there was a seizure.84 The court
concluded that Johnson’s stop was more than a momentary pause
before fleeing.85 Johnson was present during the entire altercation
between Wilson and Brown before he fled the scene fearing for his
life.86 The Eighth Circuit held that Johnson was seized by virtue of
being with Brown during the altercation, similar to a passenger in
a car where the driver has been seized.87
The Eighth Circuit next held that there was excessive force
used during that seizure.88 The reasonableness of the force used
during a seizure is analyzed not by “20/20 hindsight, but the
standard is the reasonable officer at the scene.” 89 The factors
78. Id.
79. Id. at *6-7.
80. Id. at *8.
81. Id. at *7.
82. Id; Davis v, White 794 F.3d 1008, 1014 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that for
plaintiffs claims that their injury was caused by municipal failure to adopt a
policy, the plaintiff must show widespread and persistent pattern of
unconstitutional conduct.). This is another excessive force case against
Ferguson, MO, the plaintiff was a post arrest detainee who was beaten and
sustained a concussion, bruising, and scalp lacerations. Id. at 1011.
83. Id.
84. Johnson v. City of Ferguson, Missouri, 864 F.3d 866, 873 (8th Cir. 2017),
as corrected (July 31, 2017), reh’g en banc granted, vacated (Sept. 12, 2017), on
reh’g en banc, 926 F.3d 504 (8th Cir. 2019).
85 Id. at 874.
86. Id. at 873.
87. Id. at 875.
88. Id. at 875.
89. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (holding that excessive force
claims should be analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard for
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considered in that analysis are the “severity of the crime, the
immediate threat the person poses to public safety and whether the
person is resisting or attempting to evade arrest.”90 The main
principle in use of force analysis is that “force is least justified
against nonviolent misdemeanants who do not flee or actively resist
arrest and pose little or no threat to the security of the officers or
the public.”91 The Eighth Circuit found that Johnson and Brown
were merely walking down the street; they were at most violating a
municipal ordinance, which posed no danger to public safety.92 They
stopped walking when Wilson created a roadblock and did not resist
or evade him.93 Thus, Wilson drawing a weapon on them, shooting
at them, and killing Brown was objectively unreasonable.94
The Eighth Circuit held there was a clearly established law
by their own jurisprudence.95 A clearly established constitutional
right does not require case law with similar facts to be clearly
defined.96 In a case with novel facts, it requires a “beyond debatable”
question of whether an action was proper or improper.97 Officers are
on notice that deadly force should not be used unless there is danger
of serious bodily injury or death of the officer others. 98 In Brown v.
City of Golden Valley, “this court held that the use of a Taser on a
person whose only noncompliance with the officer’s commands was
to disobey two orders to end her phone call to a 911 operator”
constituted excessive force.”99 In Shekleton v. Eichenberger, the
Fourth Amendment seizures.). The inquiry is whether the officer’s actions in
using force are objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances the officer
faced with no regard to underlying intent or motivation. Id.
90. Id.
91. Small v. McCrystal, 708 F.3d 997, 1005 (8th Cir. 2013) (denying qualified
immunity for a police officer who tackled an arrestee even though he was
engaged in no violent behavior and the officer gave no warning to disperse).
92. Johnson, 864 F.3d at 875.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (denying qualified immunity to
a prison guard for handcuffing a prisoner to a hitch post in the sun for seven
hours with no bathroom breaks holding that a constitutional violation can be
clearly established even in novel situations.). The Court held that when there
is no on point case law, an action can be clearly established as unconstitutional
when the action’s constitutionality is beyond debate. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954, 962 (8th Cir. 2005) (denying
qualified immunity for a police officer when he fatally shot a man, who was
wrestling a carjacker for his gun, without trying to deescalate the situation.).
The officer gave no warning that he was about to shoot even though giving a
warning would have been feasible in that situation especially since he knew one
of the parties was the victim of criminal activity and one was the offender. Id.
99. See Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 499 (8th Cir.
2009) (denying qualified immunity to an officer who Tasered someone he was
about to arrest whose only noncompliance with his orders was that they did not
end their phone call as he ordered them to.). The Eighth Circuit held that it is
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Eighth Circuit held the use of a taser on an individual that police
were attempting to handcuff was excessive force because the
individual was not attempting to flee nor were they acting
aggressively toward police.100 The Eighth Circuit held in Johnson
that tasers typically are less force and generally less harmful than
guns.101 “It follows that, if the use of a [t]aser in these circumstances
constitutes excessive force, the use of a gun in these circumstances
necessarily constitutes excessive force.”102
The Eighth Circuit held that there was supervisory liability
for the chief of police.103 The Eighth Circuit previously articulated
that “[l]iability cannot attach to a supervisor merely because a
subordinate violated someone’s constitutional rights.”104 For
liability, “[t]he supervisor must know about the conduct and
facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of
what [he or she] might see.”105 If the supervisor was not directly
involved in the incident where the constitutional violation occurred,
the supervisor is “entitled to qualified immunity unless plaintiff
proves that the supervisor (1) received notice of a pattern of
unconstitutional acts committed by a subordinate, and (2) was
deliberately indifferent to or authorized those acts.”106 The Johnson
court held that since the police chief “rarely reviews offense reports
and has never overturned a supervisor’s determination of whether
a use of force fell within [Ferguson Police Department] policy” he
had sufficient notice of the officer’s conduct. 107 By “failing to review
offense reports and hold officers accountable for excessive force,
Chief Jackson was deliberately indifferent to the unconstitutional
clearly established that force is least justified against nonviolent citizens who
do not actively resist arrest, flee, and pose little to no threat to security of the
public and the officers. Id.
100. See Shekleton v. Eichenberger, 677 F.3d 361, 367 (8th Cir. 2012)
(denying qualified immunity to an officer who tasered someone he was arresting
when they both accidentally fell while he was trying to handcuff them).
101. Johnson, 864 F.3d at 876.
102. Id. at 876.
103. Id. at 877.
104. Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1997) (granting a police
chief qualified immunity because there was insufficient evidence that he was
aware of a pattern of Constitutional violations by an officer.). The plaintiff could
only cite to two incidents which were not similar to the issue they faced with
the officer, that they alleged were constitutional violations. Id.
105. Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 551 (8th Cir. 2007) (affirming the
district court’s denial of summary judgement on qualified immunity defense for
a jail supervisor who the detained claimed was deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk that she would be sexually assaulted by a prison guard.). The
indifference to a substantial risk does not require knowledge of the abuse, but
a failure to act when they became aware of the risk of substantial harm. Id.
106. S.M. v. Krigbaum, 808 F.3d 335, 340 (8th Cir. 2015) (granting qualified
immunity to a sheriff who was unaware of the sexual misconduct that a
lieutenant committed during the supervision of drug court participants and
fired the lieutenant as soon as he was made aware).
107. Johnson, 864 F.3d at 877.
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practices carried out by Ferguson police officers.”108
The Eighth Circuit did not have appellate jurisdiction over
the municipal liability claims.109 It concluded that the issue of
whether Wilson and the police chief were entitled to qualified
immunity turned on whether they violated Johnson’s Fourth
Amendment rights, but municipal liability does not.110 Municipal
liability turns on whether the “constitutional violation was caused
by the city engaging in a widespread and persistent pattern of
unconstitutional misconduct that municipal policymakers were
either deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized.” 111 The
municipal liability claims are not dependent on the denial of
qualified immunity for the officers because they are two separate
questions.112 Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that it did not have
jurisdiction over the appeal of the municipal claims.113 Wilson and
the police chief petitioned for a rehearing en banc which was
granted.114

III. COURT’S ANALYSIS
First, this section will cover the Eight Circuit’s en banc
opinion. Then, it will turn to the dissent’s opinion. Finally, this
section will look at the impact of the holding on the parties, the
residents of Ferguson, and the briefs for certiorari to the Supreme
Court, which were denied.

A. The En Banc Panel Held that Johnson was not
Seized and Vacates the Lower Court Decision
First, the court narrowed the issue to whether there was a
seizure since both parties acknowledged that if there was no
seizure, then all other charges must be dismissed.115 The court first
looked at Wilson’s cursing expletives at Johnson and Brown. 116
108. Id.
109. Id; Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 394 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that courts only have appellate jurisdiction regarding interlocutory
appeals if the claim of one necessarily resolves the other issue).
110. Johnson, 864 F.3d at 877.
111. Davis v. White, 794 F.3d 1008, 1014 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding the
plaintiff must prove the poor record keeping directly caused his injury for a
finding of municipality liability).
112. Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 78 F.3d 1264, 1270 (1996) (holding that the
denial of summary judgement on municipal liability claim was not inextricably
intertwined with the underlying qualified immunity claim because the claims
require two different analyses).
113. Johnson, 864 F.3d at 877.
114. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 504-05.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 506.
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Johnson conceded that neither he nor Brown was ordered to stop or
freeze.117 Based on this concession, the en banc panel concluded that
Johnson made the decision to remain by Brown’s side during
Brown’s altercation with Wilson rather than complying with
Wilson’s command to get on the sidewalk.118 The court found that
since Johnson was not physically restrained, did not comply with
the order to get on the sidewalk, and chose to flee instead, he was
never seized.119 The court found that Johnson’s ability to flee was
sufficient evidence that there was no seizure.120 Further, the court
concluded that Wilson’s police vehicle was not a barrier to Johnson
being able to cross the street.121 The court compared this situation
to the officers in United States v. Hayden, where the Eighth Circuit
held there was no seizure where the defendants were merely
approached by police officers.122
The court did not analyze the excessive force claim, only
offering one sentence about the use of a gun on Johnson and
Brown.123 “Any physical or weapon-related contact by Wilson was
directed towards Brown alone in the first instance.”124
The court then turned to the requirement of submission for
there to be a seizure, relying on Brendlin v. California.125
Submission would require a “verbal or physical impediment to
Johnson’s freedom of movement,” which the court decided was not
present in this case.126 The court concluded that there was no
seizure because there was no “intentional acquisition of physical
control terminating Johnson’s freedom of movement through
means intentionally applied which occurred in Brower v. County of
Inyo and Tennessee v Garner.”127 There is a string cite of cases from
other circuits the court offered as standing for the same legal

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.; United State v. Hayden, 759 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding
there was no seizure when the police merely shined a light on the citizens,
identified themselves as police, and approached the citizens) The police did not
block their ability to cross the street, did not touch the men, and did not display
weapons. Id.
123. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 506.
124. Id.
125. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007) (holding passengers
are seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment during traffic stops
and can challenge that seizure as unreasonable in court).
126. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 506.
127. Id.; Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (holding that the
creation of a roadblock constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure because the
government terminated the freedom of through means intentionally applied);
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that a Tennessee statute which
authorized police to use deadly force to prevent suspected felons from escaping
violated the Fourth Amendment).
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conclusion as the decision in this case.128 However, the court offered
no analogies as to why these cases were similar.129
On the claim of supervisory liability, the court held that
there was no liability since “to maintain an action for training or
supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show the failure to train or
supervise caused the injury.”130 The court also held there was no
municipal liability because, in order for municipal liability to
attach, individual liability first must be found on an underlying
substantive claim.131

B. The Dissent Would Affirm the Lower Court
The dissent concluded that this was an unreasonable seizure
and went through a step-by-step analysis of Fourth Amendment
unreasonable seizures, unlike the majority.132 The dissent began the
analysis with a discussion of show of authority seizures.133 For a
plaintiff to successfully state a claim of “seizure through a show of
authority (rather than through physical force), the plaintiff must
demonstrate both (1) a show of authority and (2) actual submission
to that show of authority.”134
The dissent categorized Wilson’s actions as a show of
authority seizure.135 There is an objective reasonable person test for

128. United States v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991,1000 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that
no reasonable person in appellant’s position would have felt free to terminate
the encounter where officers approached the appellant, but appellant had not
submitted until he discarded his loaded gun); United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d
1059, 1067 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding the defendant did not submit to the officer’s
initial show of authority and backing his car away was evasive.). It concluded
he did not submit to the officer’s authority until he got out of the car. Id.; United
States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing the grant of
motion to suppress because the defendant did not submit when the police pulled
their guns on everyone on the porch, so he was not seized); United States v.
Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the defendant did not
submit to police authority when he stopped momentarily after being approached
by police); United States v. Letsinger, 93 F.3d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the defendant’s luggage wasn’t seized on a train until he gave police access
to the luggage not when the train began moving); United States v. Hernandez,
27 F.3d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defendant was not seized
because he never submitted to authority or was physically subdued in a foot
chase with a police officer); United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1132
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that the defendant was not seized because he
abandoned his car when told to stop by police officers instead of submitting to
their authority).
129. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 506.
130. Id. (quoting Moore v. City of Desloge, 647 F.3d 841, 849 (8th Cir. 2011)).
131. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 506.
132. Id. at 507 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007).
135. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 508 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
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the show of authority.136 The test is “not whether the citizen
perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement, but
whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed that
to a reasonable person.”137 The test also considers “[whether] the
officer’s conduct convey[s] to a reasonable person that they are not
at liberty to ignore the police presence.”138 The analysis should
center around the “totality of the circumstances.”139 This analysis
has several relevant factors such as the “presence of several officers,
display of weapons by officers, physical touching of the person or
use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance will be
compelled.”140
The dissent characterized the Eight Circuit’s holdings on
police seizure as a high hurdle to constitute the police seizure. 141
The dissent cited a few cases where the Eighth Circuit has held that
there was no Fourth Amendment seizure.142 For instance, in one
case the Eighth Circuit held that there was no seizure when the
police parked their car behind the defendant’s car, activated the wig
wag lights, and approached the defendant’s car.143 In another case,
the Eighth Circuit held there was no seizure “when a police officer
pulled his vehicle alongside the defendant, shined a flashlight on
him, and yelled ‘Police!’”144
The dissent then applied the show of authority seizure test
to Wilson’s actions in the interaction with Johnson and Brown and
136. Id.
135. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 254 (holding that the in a seizure analysis the
relevant question should be whether a reasonable person would believe they are
able to terminate their encounter with the police.) In this case the court found
that none of the passenger’s felt free to terminate the encounter with the police.
Id.
137. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (holding that the free to
leave inquiry is about termination of the encounter with police not whether the
subject is able to leave the location of the encounter.). In this case, Florida had
a per se law that made all police encounters on buses seizures which was
overturned. Id.
138. United States v. Johnson, 326 F.3d 1018, 1021 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that there was no unreasonable seizure when the defendant engaged with the
police officer consensually until they decided to flee).
139. United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 474 F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 2007)
(holding there was no unreasonable seizure when the defendant openly
admitted that was an undocumented immigrant to an immigration agent. It
held the totality of the circumstances show he was in a non-threatening
environment when asked).
140. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 508 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. United States v. Cook, 842 F.3d 597, 601 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding there
was no unlawful seizure when police approached a parked car and turned the
wig wag lights on). Wig wag lights are the lights that flash the headlamps on
the police car.
143. United States v. Hayden, 759 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2014) holding that
there was no unreasonable seizure when the police stopped the defendant on
the sidewalk and told him to take his hand out of his pocket).
144. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 508 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
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viewed them in the light most favorable to Johnson.145 Wilson began
the interaction by yelling expletives at the plaintiff while he and
Brown were just walking down the street.146 Wilson then abruptly
created a roadblock and stopped the car and struck Brown with the
door. Wilson escalated the situation even further by grabbing
Brown through the car window and then threatening to shoot the
two young men.147 Wilson then opened fire on the young men, which
is when Johnson began to flee.148 The dissent concluded that
“Wilson communicated an intent to use a roadblock to stop
Johnson’s movement.”149 The dissent reasoned that a “reasonable
person would see the roadblock’s purpose was to serve as a physical
obstacle conveying an order to stop – not an order to go around the
vehicle and continue on one’s way.”150
The dissent then addressed the amicus curiae brief from the
National Police Association.151 The amicus claimed that the order
was just “simply for two pedestrians to get off the street and use the
sidewalk and that [h]e did not order anything other than
compliance with the law.”152 These are commonly categorized as
“move on orders” and are meant to communicate that the person
can’t remain where they are, but they are free to go anywhere
else.153 They claimed that this move on order would make the
reasonable person believe that they are still free to go on their
way.154 The dissent acknowledged that there is a circuit split on the
issue of whether move on orders constitutes Fourth Amendment
seizures and that the Eighth Circuit has never decided a case about
move on orders.155 Most of the decisions that do exist on move on
orders turn on whether there was physical contact between the
officers and citizens.156 The dissent concluded that the facts were
not as simple as the amicus curiae claimed.157 In viewing the facts
in the light most favorable to Johnson, the facts showed a situation
escalated by Wilson that conveyed that Johnson was not free to
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id; Bostick, 501 U.S.at 437 (analyzing whether a person feels at liberty
to ignore police presence.) The dissent analyzed liberty to ignore the police
presence and whether the show of authority was also aimed at Johnson under
Brendlin, 551 U.S. 261.
150. Id.
151. Id (quoting Brief for National Police Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellants, Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 926 F.3d 504 (8th Cir.
2019) (No. 16-1697)).
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 509 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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ignore Wilson’s presence.158
The dissent categorized Johnson’s stopping as submission. 159
“Fleeing or refusing to comply with a show of authority does not
qualify as submission to authority, stopping one’s movement often
qualifies as submission.”160 Temporary stopping does not always
count, but the analysis of what constitutes whether a stop was made
largely depends on the facts of the case.161 “Johnson remained
throughout the time that Officer Wilson reached through his
window and grabbed Brown, threatened to shoot his weapon,
wrestled with Brown who struggled to break free, and then twice
fired his weapon.”162 The dissent concluded that the facts could not
be generalized so much to say that only Brown may have been
seized.163 The two were walking together when Wilson approached
them and created a roadblock, and they were together when Wilson
fired his gun at the pair and killed Brown.164 The dissent concluded
that “if one of the two were seized, both were seized.”165
The dissent acknowledged that passive acquiescence can be
submission to a show of authority.166 Passive acquiescence can be
as simple as remaining where the seized person is. 167 The dissent
concluded that Johnson actively acquiesced to Wilson’s show of
authority because he stopped walking.168
There was no argument that there was an objective reason
that the use of deadly force was employed on Johnson, so the dissent
concluded that the issue was abandoned on appeal. 169 The dissent
did not address the supervisory liability or municipal liability
claims.170

C. Effects on the Parties
The effect this holding had on the parties was that Johnson
had no recourse for being shot at by a police officer and Wilson
suffered no legal consequences for shooting at Johnson or killing
Brown.171 A year after the shooting, Wilson was living a quiet life
158. Id.
159. Id. at 510.
160. Id.
161. United States v. Baldwin, 496 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that
the defendants temporary stop while driving when he saw the police car did not
constitute a seizure because after the temporary stop, he began a car chase).
162. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 510 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.; Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255 (holding that submission depends on
what the person was doing before the show of authority).
168. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 510 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 511 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 510 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 506; see Joel Currier, St. Louis County Prosecutor Reopened
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with his newborn and wife with over half a million dollars in
donations to help with his legal fees.172 While he could not get
another police job because he could be viewed as a liability173 he was
nonetheless honored by the Columbia Police Department with a
Darren Wilson Day on the first anniversary of his killing of Michael
Brown.174
A 2019 check on Johnson showed that he had been living a
rougher path since the shooting.175 In the months following the
shooting, Johnson lost his job and apartment, and he still has a hard
time keeping a steady job because he gets recognized regularly. 176
Johnson was just getting his life back on track five years after the
shooting.177

D. Effect on the Community
Granting qualified immunity, in this case, has ensured that
Michael Brown shooting Case but won’t Charge Darren Wilson, STL TODAY
(July 31, 2020), www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-countyprosecutor-reopened-michael-brown-shooting-case-but-wont-charge-darrenwilson/article_8e537a12-4dd0-51d8-a325-11ba7dddd20e.html [perma.cc/45YC54LL] (covering the announcement that the St. Louis County prosecutor began
a quiet investigation on whether charges should be brought against Darren
Wilson for killing Michael Brown.). They concluded no charges should be
brought. Id.
172. Jake Halpern, The Cop, NEW YORKER (Aug. 3, 2015),
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/10/the-cop
[perma.cc/WZV2-LBS8]
(reporting on Darren Wilson’s life since he shot Michael Brown. At the time he
was unemployed and living a very private life with his wife, new baby, and
stepchildren.) The article also discusses his career path as a police officer. He
began his police career in Jennings, MO a town notorious for its racism where
the police force in the town was disbanded. Id. The article also focuses on his
time in Ferguson’s Police department, he claims the Department of Justice
Report was skewed and no institutional racism existed, just a few bigots. Id.
173. Id.
174. Daniel Victor, Police Group’s ‘Darren Wilson Day’ Is Condemned, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/us/darren-wilson-daycolumbia-missouri-ferguson-michael-brown.html
[perma.cc/6P35-2YVE]
(reporting on police department in Columbia, MO wanted to show their support
of Darren Wilson, who they called “innocent, but persecuted” on the anniversary
of Darren Wilson killing Michael Brown.). The officers claimed it was not about
race, but they wanted to support Darren Wilson and all law enforcement agents
who face similar issues. Id.
175. Wesley Lowery, Dorian Johnson, Witness to the Ferguson shooting,
Sticks
by
his
Story,
WASH.
POST.
(Aug.
9,
2019),
www.washingtonpost.com/national/dorian-johnson-witness-to-the-fergusonshooting-sticks-by-his-story/2019/08/08/79ff3760-b77e-11e9-a0916a96e67d9cce_story.html [perma.cc/JWQ3-NMY5] (looking into Johnson’s life
immediately following the shooting which included his family having to shuffle
him around hotels in the St. Louis area to avoid press and being the target of
death threats.). The article then discusses his current life. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.

606

UIC Law Review

[55:587

no individual officer will face consequences for the violence that has
been inflicted on Black people in Ferguson.178 When interviewed
five years later, some Ferguson residents still see no change: “If
anything, it feels the same. I don’t even feel like I can call the police
to save myself.”179 James Taylor, the mayor at the time, said large
scale changes were too expensive and time consuming to undertake
along with fulfilling the consent decree. Some residents said they
could tell that FPD treated the consent decree as a punishment and
not as an opportunity to be better for the citizens of Ferguson. 180
This holding reinforced the persistent constitutional violations
committed by FPD on Black people in Ferguson.181

E. Legal Effects
Johnson petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States.182 The first argument in support of granting
certiorari was that there was a circuit split on the issue of whether
move on orders can be seizures.183 The Sixth Circuit held that move
on orders can be seizures while the Second and Eighth Circuit held
that they are not seizures.184 The Sixth Circuit has held that
someone is seized when a “reasonable person would not feel free to
remain somewhere, by virtue of some official action.”185 The Second
Circuit has focused its analysis on would a “reasonable person have
felt they were not free to leave.”186 Recently, it held that there is no
seizure “as long as the person is otherwise free to go where he
wishes.”187 The brief pointed out that the Seventh and Tenth
178. DOJ Report, supra note 22, at 62.
179. Yamiche Alcindor et al., 5 years After Michael Brown’s Death, what has
Changed in Ferguson — and what hasn’t, PBS (Aug. 8, 2019),
www.pbs.org/newshour/show/5-years-after-michael-browns-death-what-haschanged-in-ferguson-and-what-hasnt-2 [perma.cc/NAK7-XJNR] (interviewing
Ferguson residents about the fallout of the Department of Justice report, how
local politics have changed, and their beliefs about how policing has changed in
the city).
180. Id.
181. Id.; DOJ Report, supra note 22, at 62.
182. Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 140 S. Ct. 553, 2019 WL 6257423 (2019).
183. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 140
S. Ct. 553 (2019) (No. 19-345).
184. Id. at 10.
185. Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 834 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that there was a seizure when the police officer stopped Black children riding
their bikes in a costly white neighborhood and gave them a move-on order.)
After giving the move on order he waited to watch them cross Eight Mile out of
the white neighborhood). Id.
186. Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding there
was no seizure when a law clerk was physically removed from a judge’s
chambers and the courthouse after being fired).
187. Salmon v. Blesser, 802 F.3d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding there was
a seizure when the police officer twisted a man’s arm and threw him out of the
courthouse while he was in the hallway waiting on his attorney.) It held that
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Circuits have had the opportunity to decide on whether move on
orders constitute seizures, but avoided the issue.188
The brief then turned to the importance of the Supreme
Court deciding on the issue to avoid further confusion on the
issue.189 The brief argued that move on orders being uncategorized
meant that “people’s rights hinge not on clear dictates of the Fourth
Amendment, but on vagaries of geography and the whims of
individual judges.”190 The brief argued that a decision on the issue
would clarify what police activity constitutes a seizure and what
further show of police authority is necessary to seize someone.191
Wilson filed a brief in opposition to the petition for
certiorari.192 The first argument was that the issue of move on
orders was not raised by Johnson in the pleadings to the lower court
and the case. Further, the opposition brief claimed that the
petitioners were asking for the court to create a de facto rule about
whether a particular police action is a seizure would go against the
Fourth Amendment factually bound standard of analysis required
of courts.193 The opposition brief then claimed that the decision of
the Eighth Circuit en banc panel does not contrast with any
Supreme Court holdings or any of the other Circuits.194
Johnson filed a reply brief.195 The reply brief argued that
even though the amicus brief below was the only brief to mention
the words “move-on order” all parties discussed it below.196 The
generally using guiding force such as grabbing an elbow does not amount to
seizure, but this is more force than that. Id.
188. Brief for Respondent at 10, Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 140 S. Ct. 553
(2019) (No. 19-345); Kernats v. O’Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171,1181 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding there was no seizure when the police came and evicted a family in the
middle of the night.) Plaintiff asserted a claim that the family was seized
because they were not free to remain in their home. Id. at 1178. The Seventh
Circuit called this a “novel theory” of Fourth Amendment seizure and granted
qualified immunity. Id. at 1177; White v. City of Markham, 310 F.3d 989, 995
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding did not address whether there was a seizure when the
plaintiffs were thrown out of their rented apartment after a dispute with the
landlord.). The Seventh Circuit held because of the domestic disturbance the
police officer was tasked to resolve the removal of the plaintiffs was reasonable.
Id; Hamilton v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, Ill., 735 F.3d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding
that not every expulsion is a confinement or a seizure). In this case the plaintiff
was detained in her employer’s home while the police tried resolve the domestic
dispute. Id. No force was used against her nor were any charges filed against
her. Id.
189. Brief for Respondent at 24, Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 140 S. Ct. 553
(2019) (No. 19-345).
190. Id. at 27.
191. Id. at 10.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 13.
194. Id. at 16.
195. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 1, Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 140 S. Ct.
553 (2019) (No. 19-345).
196. Id. at 5.
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reply brief claimed the move on order was Wilson’s crude directive
to get on the sidewalk which was discussed by the parties in their
briefs below.197 The reply brief also claimed they are not asking for
a per se rule about move on orders but saying the Second and Eighth
Circuits were incorrect in holding that “regardless of all the
circumstances there is no seizure during a move on order.198 The
writ of certiorari was denied.199

IV. PERSONAL ANALYSIS
This section of the Case Note will focus on analysis of the
case. First, this section will discuss why the writ of certiorari should
have been granted. Then it will address the circuit split on move on
orders, as well as issues with qualified immunity.

A. Fourth Amendment Issue
The writ of certiorari should have been granted because the
Eighth Circuit en banc panel created a per se rule in holding that
since Johnson was able to flee, he could not have been seized.200 Per
se rules are considered inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment
unreasonable seizure context because the right is analyzed by the
facts of each case.201 The en banc panel focused on Johnson’s ability
to flee from the scene as determinative of whether there was a
seizure.202 However, the en banc panel dismissed the factors that
heightened this interaction to an unreasonable seizure such as the
display of a weapon and language or tone of voice that indicated
compliance with the officer’s requests might be compelled.203 Wilson
threatened and shot at Johnson, which forced him to flee.204 Fleeing
from gunfire is not the same as fleeing to avoid something benign
like a jaywalking ticket. However, this per se rule that if someone
is able to flee means there is no seizure leads to this absurd result.
Further, not factoring the violent behavior of the officer when the
plaintiff is also claiming that the officer used excessive force during
the unreasonable seizure is an alarming departure from the
standards set by the Supreme Court, which has held that whether
a seizure occurred depends on the facts of the police interaction. 205

197. Id.
198. Id..
199. Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 140 S. Ct. 553 (2019).
200. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 505-06.
201. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (holding that the
Eleventh Circuit’s per se rule that passengers on a bus were seized was
inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context).
202. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 506.
203. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 US 544, 554 (1980).
204. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 506.
205. California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991).
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This en banc panel disregarded the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and created a per se rule about what
constitutes an unreasonable seizure.

B. Circuit Split on move on orders
There is a circuit split on move on orders because the
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue.206 The Second
Circuit created a per se rule that move on orders do not constitute
unreasonable seizures unless there is physical contact. 207 Even
then, the physical contact must be “sufficient to intentionally
restrain a person and gain control of his movements.”208 The Second
Circuit also suggests that something such as a physical shove with
a move on order may not be a seizure, but a collar grab and arm
twist does allege a seizure.209 The Seventh Circuit did not
meaningfully address the issue and called it a novel theory of
Fourth Amendment seizures.210 The Sixth Circuit inquires
“whether a reasonable person would not feel free to remain
somewhere because of some official action” when faced with move
on orders.211 In this case, the Eighth Circuit has created a per se
rule that move on orders cannot constitute Fourth Amendment
seizures no matter what force the officer uses.212 Overall, the state
of move on orders has the different circuits in a state of confusion
leaving constitutional rights unclear. The Supreme Court should
have taken this chance to clarify.

C. Issues with SCOTUS and Qualified Immunity
While the Fourth Amendment question presented here is
pressing and certiorari should have been granted, the larger hoop
to jump would have been qualified immunity. Legal scholars are
increasingly concerned about the battle plaintiffs are fighting to
overcome qualified immunity.213 Some believe the Supreme Court
206. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (holding the Chicago
Gang Ordinance which allowed the police to give move on orders to anyone they
thought was a gang member was unconstitutional because of its vagueness.)
This is the closest the Supreme Court has gotten to deciding on move on orders.
Id.
207. Sheppard v. Beerman,18 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 1994).
208. Salmon v. Blesser 802 F.3d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 2015).
209. Id. at 254.
210. Kernats, 35 F.3d at 1177.
211. Bennett, 410 F.3d at 834.
212. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 505-06.
213. Karen Blum et. al, Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope
Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633, 642-51 (2013) (discussing how
qualified immunity has developed since the Supreme Court held in Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009), that the prong of whether there was a
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has practiced avoidance of analyzing the merits of whether a right
was violated under the Fourth Amendment, preferring to skip the
prong of whether there was a constitutional violation when they
have analyzed qualified immunity claims.214 They have declined to
clarify the issues citizens are facing with police even in a case as
erroneously decided as Johnson v. City of Ferguson.215 The case does
not follow the analysis that the Supreme Court established over the
years, but the Court refused the opportunity to correct and
clarify.216 Even when police brutality cases do make it to the
Supreme Court, police are usually granted qualified immunity and
suffer no legal consequences for killing people.217 The Supreme
Court even went so far as to chide district courts for the number of
times they have had to vacate denials of qualified immunity based
on highly generalized rights.218
While qualified immunity does pose a hurdle for
constitutional claims, it has a strong public policy reasoning behind
it.219 It balances two important interests, accountability for public
officials and shielding officials “from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”220 Further,
law enforcement officers have to make split second decisions about
public safety and they should be shielded from suit for making
reasonable mistakes in high stakes situations.221 However,
qualified immunity has shielded officers from liability “because the
law is unclear, and the law is unclear because the violation
continues to go unaddressed.”222 The analysis becomes circular
leading to the result that it does not matter whether the
Constitution is being violated because the analysis centers around
constitutional violation does not have to be analyzed first.). The authors
concluded that this has proved to give plaintiffs a lower chance at prevailing
because the Supreme Court can choose to avoid the merits of their claim. They
further conclude that this avoidance of the merits is bleeding down to the
district and circuit courts. Blum, supra note 213, at 642-51.
214. Id.
215. Johnson, 926 F.3d at 504.
216. Johnson, 140 S. Ct. at 553.
217. John F. Acevedo, Restoring Community Dignity, 59 HOW. L. J. 621
(2016) (discussing the likelihood that police will be granted qualified immunity
is so high which is part of the reason the article suggests giving amnesty to the
police who are willing to participate in Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
218. Id; White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (holding the lower court
erred in denying qualified immunity for an officer who killed a man because he
was unaware of what steps had been taken before he arrived at the scene).
219. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
220. Id.
221. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
222. Michael Silverstein, Rebalancing Harlow: A New Approach to Qualified
Immunity in the Fourth Amendment. 68 CASE W. RES. 495, 522 (2017)
(proposing a new qualified immunity approach because they argue the current
one is too deferential to police especially in Fourth Amendment cases.). This
leads to many plaintiffs being unable to recover because the bar to defeat
qualified immunity is so high. Id. at 520.
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clearly established rights. There must be a better way to strike the
balance between the need to protect police from liability for every
mistake and the rampant police brutality that faces Americans.

D. Congress Needs to Act
Police brutality is one of the most prevalent civil rights issues
facing America today, but the courts are coming to different
conclusions on when the officers are liable for their conduct. The
lack of agreement between the courts on these issues creates
unclear constitutional rights for American citizens and the
Supreme Court will not correct this. At first glance, this situation
seems hopeless. However, there is a solution left: legislation from
Congress. Congress can create legislation if they do not approve of
the way the courts have been handling an issue. 223 One of the
focuses of that legislation should be greater coherence between the
DOJ findings and the cases the Supreme Court takes on. This
section proposes that the case that caused the investigation and
subsequent consent decree, be litigated first in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia and for the appeals to go
straight to the Supreme Court.

E. Inconsistency Issue
The most glaring inconsistency in these proceedings is that
the DOJ found that the FPD regularly violated the Constitution,
but the Supreme Court refused to hear the case. 224 There seems to
be a disconnect between the purpose of having a civil rights division
to investigate these issues and the willingness of the Supreme
Court to take them on. This case is exactly on point with the DOJ
report, which said officers of the FPD frequently used excessive
force in legally unsupportable stops.225 This report led to the city
entering into a consent decree because their police department was
not complying with the Constitution, and in this case neither were
their courts.226 Johnson, an African American man, was suing a
police department known for violating the rights of its citizens,
especially African Americans, but this case was not deemed worthy
enough to hear.227 While the future change required by the consent
decree will be good for the city, it is not enough to only make future
223. The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, U.S. SUPREME COURT,
www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx
[perma.cc/W4L5-5KWA]
(last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
224. Id.; Consent Decree, United States v. City or Ferguson (No. 4:16-cv000180-CDP, E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016).
225. DOJ Report, supra note 22, at 62.
226. Id.
227. Id.; Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 140 S. Ct. at 553
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changes and do nothing for the people who have already been
harmed. Dorian Johnson was shot at, witnessed Michael Brown
being killed, and his safety was put in danger for months after the
killing.228 Yet the highest court in the country refused to even hear
his case.229 The solutions to policing cannot only be forward
thinking, but they must contemplate and remedy the past as other
civil rights actions have done.

F. Comparison to Voting Rights Act
People often reflect on the Civil Rights Movement of the
1960s as a period of great activism of African Americans to further
equality and justice.230 When trying to remedy civil rights issues
that plague the United States today, we should look at the way civil
rights issues have been remedied in the past as a guide on what
works. Congress had to step in to create new laws that would
protect African Americans and remedy the issues such as the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.231
This direct line to the Supreme Court remedy was introduced
in the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 232 It required jurisdictions who
were engaged in racist voter suppression tactics prior to the act to
either litigate their proposed voting changes this way or do an
administrative review with the DOJ.233 This is the same sort of
coherence between the courts and the DOJ that should be required
in the police brutality context. The current way police brutality is
handled between the DOJ and the courts only focuses on the future
and compliance with the consent decrees, but nothing about what
has already happened.
Many will point out that this requirement was seriously
undermined in Shelby County v. Holder. 234 In that case, a county in
Alabama successfully argued that the preclearance their voting
decisions were subject to were unconstitutional.235 However, the
Supreme Court held that the determination of which states were

228. Lowery, supra note 175.
229. Johnson, 140 S. Ct. at 553.
230. Leroy Clark, New Directions For The Civil Rights Movement: College
Athletics as a Civil Rights Issue, 36 HOW. L. J. 259, 274 (1993) (discussing the
success of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and how the same tactics can
be applied to the exploitation of Black college athletes).
231. Id.
232. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2022) (outlawing voting laws that serve the purpose
of denying the citizens the right to vote based on race).
233. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (a) (2022) .
234. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 559 (2013) (holding that the
formula for determining which jurisdictions are subject to preclearance
requirement is outdated and therefore unconstitutional.). The Court did not
hold the remedy unconstitutional and left it open to being used again if the data
was updated. Id.
235. Id.
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subject to preclearance was based on outdated data.236 It did not
hold that the requirement for those states to litigate in a manner
specified above was unconstitutional.237 This remedy is open to
apply to different civil rights issues and Congress should take it.
Like voting, the constitutional issues posed by police brutality are
civil rights that require a multilayered approach to begin to remedy
them. If the courts refuse to remedy the constitutional issues that
are facing citizens, then Congress needs to respond and push the
courts to respond to the issue.

V. CONCLUSION
Nothing can remedy the trauma Dorian Johnson experienced
on August 9, 2014, when he witnessed the death of his neighbor, nor
the trauma he experienced from the resulting news sensationalism.
However, our legal system needs to learn from the mistakes made
here. The courts and Congress must do their part in creating
accountability for law enforcement. American citizens can’t wait
around and rely on hope alone, there needs to be accountability for
the harm African Americans are facing every day. Without an
immediate change via legislation, the number of citizens like Dorian
Johnson, who are left with no remedy for their suffering at the
hands of police, will continue to grow.

236. Id.
237. Id.
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